The goal of an algorithm substitution attack (ASA), also called a subversion attack (SA), is to replace an honest implementation of a cryptographic tool by a subverted one which allows to leak private information while generating output indistinguishable from the honest output. Bellare, Paterson, and Rogaway provided at CRYPTO '14 a formal security model to capture this kind of attacks and constructed practically implementable ASAs against a large class of symmetric encryption schemes. At CCS'15, Ateniese, Magri, and Venturi extended this model to allow the attackers to work in a fully-adaptive and continuous fashion and proposed subversion attacks against digital signature schemes. Both papers also showed the impossibility of ASAs in cases where the cryptographic tools are deterministic. Also at CCS'15, Bellare, Jaeger, and Kane strengthened the original model and proposed a universal ASA against sufficiently random encryption schemes. In this paper we analyze ASAs from the perspective of steganography -the well known concept of hiding the presence of secret messages in legal communications. While a close connection between ASAs and steganography is known, this lacks a rigorous treatment. We consider the common computational model for secret-key steganography and prove that successful ASAs correspond to secure stegosystems on certain channels and vice versa. This formal proof allows us to conclude that ASAs are stegosystems and to "rediscover" several results concerning ASAs known in the steganographic literature.
INTRODUCTION
The publication of secret internal documents of the NSA by Edward Snowden (see e. g. [4, 14, 20] ) allowed the cryptographic community a unique insight into some well-kept secrets of one of the world's largest security agency. Two conclusions may be drawn from these reveals: Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. • On the one hand, even a large organization such as the NSA seems not to be able to break well established implementations of cryptographic primitives such as RSA or AES. • On the other hand, the documents clearly show that the NSA develops methods and techniques to circumvent the well established security notions by e. g. manipulating standardization processes (e. g. issues surrounding the Dual_EC_DRBG number generator [11, 23, 25] ) or reason about metadata.
This confirms that the security guarantees provided by the cryptographic community are sound, but also indicates that some security definitions are too narrow to evade all possible attacks, including (non-)intentional improper handling of theoretically sound cryptographic protocols. A very realistic attack which goes beyond the common framework is a modification of an appropriate implementation of a secure protocol. The modified implementation should remain indistinguishable from a truthful one and its aim is to allow leakage of secret information during subsequent runs of the subverted protocol. Attacks of this kind are known in the literature [2, 6, 7, 21, 28, 29] and an overview on this topic is given in the current survey [24] by Schneier et al.
A powerful class of such attacks that we will focus on -coined secretly embedded trapdoor with universal protection (SETUP) attacks -was presented over twenty years ago by Young and Yung in the kleptographic model framework [28, 29] . The model is meant to capture a situation where an adversary (or "big brother" as we shall occasionally say) has the opportunity to implement (and, indeed, "mis-implement" or subvert) a basic cryptographic tool. The difficulty in detecting such an attack is based on the hardness of program verification. By using closed source software, the user must trust the developers that their implementation of cryptographic primitives is truthful and does not contain any backdoors. This is especially true for hardware-based cryptography [7] . But it is difficult to verify this property. Even if the software is open sourcethe source code is publicly available -the sheer complexity of cryptographic implementations allows only very specialized experts to be able to judge these implementations. Two of the most prominent bugs of the widely spread cryptographic library OpenSSL 1 -the Heartbleed bug and Debian's faulty implementation of the pseudorandom number generator -remained undiscovered for more than two years [24] .
Inspired by Snowden's reveals, the recent developments reignited the interest in these kind of attacks. Bellare et al. named them algorithm substitution attacks (ASA) and showed several attacks on certain symmetric encryption schemes [7] . Note that they defined a very weak model, where the only goal of the attacker was to distinguish between two ciphertexts, but mostly used a stronger scenario with the aim to recover the encryption key. Degabriele et al. criticized the model of [7] by pointing out the results crucially rely on the fact that a subverted encryption algorithm always needs to produce valid ciphertexts (the decryptability assumption) and proposed a refined security notion [13] . The model of algorithm substitution attacks introduced in [7] was extended to signature schemes by Ateniese et al. in [2] . Simultaneously, Bellare et al. [6] strengthened the result of [7] by enforcing that the attack needs to be stateless.
In this paper we thoroughly analyze (general) ASAs from the steganographic point of view. The principle goal of steganography is to hide information in unsuspicious communication such that no observer can distinguish between normal documents and documents that carry additional information. Modern steganography was first made popular due to the prisoners' problem by Simmons [26] but, interestingly, the model was inspired by detecting the risk of ASAs during development of the SALT2 treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States in the late seventies [27] . This sheds some light on the inherent relationship between these two frameworks which is well known in the literature (see e. g. [22, 28, 29] ).
Our main achievement is providing a strict relationship between secure algorithm substitution attacks and the common computational model for secret-key steganography. Particularly, we prove that successful ASAs correspond to secure stegosystems on certain channels and vice versa. This formal proof allows us to conclude that ASAs are stegosystems and to "rediscover" results of [2, 6, 7] concerning ASAs.
The computational model for steganography used in this paper was first presented by Hopper, Langford, and von Ahn [15, 16] and independently proposed by Katzenbeisser and Petitcolas [18] . A stegosystem consists of an encoder and a decoder sharing a key. The encoder's goal is to embed a secret message into a sequence of documents which are send via a public communication channel C monitored by an adversary (often called the warden due to the prisoners problem of Simmons [26] ). The warden wants to distinguish documents that carry no secret information from those sent by the encoder. If all polynomial-time (in the security parameter κ) wardens fail to distinguish these cases, we say that the stegosystem is secure. If the decoder is able to reconstruct the secret message from the sequence send by the encoder, the system is called reliable.
Our Results
We first investigate algorithm substitution attacks against symmetric encryption schemes in the framework by Bellare et al. [6] . We model encryption schemes as steganographic channels in appropriate way which allows to relate algorithm substitution attacks with steganographic systems and vice versa. This leads to the following result. Theorem 1.1 (Informal). Assume that SES is a symmetric encryption scheme. Then there exists an indistinguishable and reliable algorithm substitution attack against SES if and only if there exists a secure and reliable stegosystem on the channel determined by SES.
The proof of the theorem is constructive in the sense that we give an explicit construction of an algorithm substitution attack against SES from a stegosystem and vice versa. As conclusion we provide a generic ASA against every symmetric encryption scheme SES whose insecurity is negligible if, roughly speaking, SES has sufficiently large min-entropy. Our algorithm against SES achieves almost the same performance as the construction of Bellare et al. (see Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 in [6] and also our discussion in Section 6).
Next, we generalize our construction and show a generic algorithm substitution attack ASA against any (polynomial-time) randomized algorithm R which, with hardwired secret s, takes inputs x and generates outputs y. Algorithm ASA, using a hidden hardwired random key ak, returns upon the secret s the sequenceỹ 1 ,ỹ 2 , . . . such that the output is indistinguishable from R(s, x 1 ), R(s, x 2 ), . . . andỹ 1 ,ỹ 2 , . . . embeds the secret s. From this result we conclude: Theorem 1.2 (Informal). There exists a generic algorithm substitution attack ASA that allows an undetectable subversion of any cryptographic primitive of sufficiently large min-entropy.
As a corollary we obtain the result of Ateniese et al. (Theorem 1 in [2] ) that for every coin-injective signature scheme, there is a successful algorithm substitution attack of negligible insecurity. Moreover we get (Theorem 2 in [2] ) that for every coin-extractable signature scheme, there is a successful and secure ASA. We can conclude also (Theorem 3 in [2] ) that unique signature schemes are resistant to ASAs fulfilling the verifiability condition. Roughly speaking the last property means that each message has exactly one signature and the ASA can only produce valid signatures.
We furthermore introduce the concept of universal ASAs that can be used without a detailed description of the implementation of the underlying cryptographic primitive and note that almost all known ASAs belong to this class. Based upon this definition, we prove the following upper bound on the information that can be embedded into a single ciphertext: Theorem 1.4 (Informal). No universal ASA is able to embed more than O(1) · log(κ) bits of information into a single ciphertext in the random oracle model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the basic preliminaries and notations that we use throughout this work, Section 3 presents the formal definitions of algorithm substitution attacks, and Section 4 gives the necessary background on steganography. In order to relate ASAs and steganography, we make use of an appropriate channel for symmetric encryption schemes defined in Section 5. The proof of Theorem 1.1 is given in Section 6, where one direction is contained in Theorem 6.1 and the other direction is given as Theorem 6.3. We generalize our results to arbitrary randomized algorithms in Section 7. Combining the positive results of Theorem 7.1 with the generic stegosystem provided by Theo- 
BASIC PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS
We use the following standard notations. A function f : N → N is negligible, if for all c ∈ N, there is an n 0 ∈ N such that f (n) < n −c for all n ≥ n 0 . The set of all strings of length n on an alphabet Σ is denoted by Σ n and the set of all strings of length at most n is denoted by Σ ≤n := ∪ n i=0 Σ i . If S is a set, x ← S denotes the uniform random assignment of an element of S to x. If A is a randomized algorithm, x ← A denotes the random assignment (with regard to the internal randomness of A) of the output of A to x. The min-entropy measures the amount of randomness of a probability distribution D and is defined as
is the support of D. Moreover, PPTM stands for probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine.
A symmetric encryption scheme SES is a triple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms (SES.Gen, SES.Enc, SES.Dec) with parameters SES.ml(κ) describing the length of the encrypted message and SES.cl(κ) describing the length of a generated cipher message. The algorithms have the following properties: If the context is clear, we also write Gen, Enc, Dec, ml and cl without the prefix SES. We say that (Gen, Enc, Dec) is reliable, if Dec(k, Enc(k, m)) = m for all k and all m. An cpa-attacker A against a symmetric encryption scheme is a PPTM that mounts chosen-plaintext-attacks (cpa): It is given a challenging oracle CH that either equals Enc k for a randomly generated key k or produces random bitstrings of length cl(κ). For an integer λ, let RAND(λ) be an algorithm that returns uniformly distributed bitstrings of length λ. The goal of A is to distinguish between those settings. Formally, this is defined via the following experiment named CPA-Dist:
CPA-Dist A,SES (κ)
Parties: attacker A, symmetric encryption scheme SES = (Gen, Enc, Dec)
Algorithm 1: Chosen-Plaintext-Attack experiment with security parameter κ.
A symmetric encryption scheme SES is cpa-secure if for every attacker A there is a negligible function negl such that Adv cpa SES (κ) := Pr[CPA-Dist A,SES (κ) = true] ≤ negl(κ). The maximal advantage of any attacker against SES is called the insecurity of SES and is defined as
For a SES = (Gen, Enc, Dec) we will assume that it has nontrivial randomization measured by the min-entropy H ∞ (SES) of ciphertexts that is defined via
For two numbers ℓ, ℓ ′ ∈ N, denote the set of all function from {0, 1} ℓ to {0, 1} ℓ ′ by Fun(ℓ, ℓ ′ ). Clearly, in order to specify a random element of Fun(ℓ, ℓ ′ ), one needs 2 ℓ × ℓ ′ bits and we can thus not use completely random functions in an efficient setting. Therefore we will use efficient functions that are indistinguishable from completely random functions. A pseudorandom function F = (F.Eval, F.Gen) is a pair of PPTMs such that F.Gen upon input 1 κ produces a key k ∈ {0, 1} κ . The keyed function F.Eval takes the key k ← F.Gen(1 κ ) and a bitstring x of length F.in(κ) and produces a string F.Eval k (x) of length F.out(κ). An attacker, called distinguisher Dist, is a PPTM that upon input 1 κ gets oracle access to a function that either equals F.Eval k for a randomly chosen key k or is a completely random function f . The goal of Dist is to distinguish between those cases. A pseudorandom function F is secure if for every distinguisher Dist there is a negligible function negl such that
where k ← F.Gen(1 κ ) and f ← Fun(F.in(κ), F.out(κ)). If Dist outputs 1, this means that the distinguisher Dist believes that he deals with a truly random function.
As usual, the maximal advantage of any distinguisher against F is called the prf-insecurity InSec 
ALGORITHM SUBSTITUTION ATTACKS AGAINST ENCRYPTION SCHEMES
While it is certainly very useful for an attacker to be able to reconstruct the key, one can also consider situations, where the extractor should be able to extract different information from the ciphertexts or signatures. We will thus generalize the algorithm substitution attacks described in the literature to the setting, where the substituted algorithm also takes a message am as argument and the goal of the extractor is to derive this message from the produced ciphertext. By always setting am := k, this is the setting described by Bellare et al. in [6] . We thus strengthen the model of [7] and [6] in this sense. Below we give in detail our definitions based upon the model proposed by Bellare et al. in [6] . If the substitution attack is stateful, we allow the distinguisher that tries to identify the attack to also choose this state and observe the internal state of the attack. Every algorithm substitution attack thus needs to be stateless, as in the model of Bellare et al. in [6] . Note that this is a stronger requirement than in [7] and [2] , as those works also allowed stateful attacks.
In our setting an algorithm substitution attack against a symmetric encryption scheme SES = (SES.Gen, SES.Enc, SES.Dec) is a triple of PPTMs ASA = (ASA.Gen, ASA.Enc, ASA.Ext) with parameter ASA.ml(κ) for the message length -the length of the attacker message -and the following functionality.
• The key generator ASA.Gen produces upon input 1 κ an attacker key ak of length κ. An algorithm substitution attack needs (a) to be indistinguishable from the symmetric encryption scheme and (b) should be able to reliably extract the message am of length ASA.ml(κ) from the ciphertexts. Due to information-theoretic reasons, it might be impossible to embed the attacker message am into a single ciphertext: If SES.Enc uses 10 bits of randomness, at most 10 bits from am can be reliably embedded into a ciphertext. Hence, the algorithm substitution attack needs to produce more than one ciphertext in this case. For message m 1 , . . . , m ℓ , the complete output, denoted as ASA.Enc ℓ (ak, am, k, m 1 , . . . , m ℓ ) is defined as follows:
To formally define the probability that the extractor is able to reliably extract am from the given ciphertexts c 1 , . . . , c ℓ , we define its reliability 2 as 1 − UnRel ASA,SES (κ), where the unreliability UnRel ASA,SES is given as
with the maximum taken over all ak ∈ supp(ASA.
The indistinguishability of an ASA is defined as follows. Call a watchdog Watch a PPTM that tries to distinguish the output of the attacker encryption algorithm ASA.Enc from the original encryption algorithm Enc. The indistinguishability is defined via the game named ASA-Dist: 2 In [6] , this is called the key recovery security.
ASA-Dist Watch,ASA,SES (κ)
Parties: watchdog Watch, algorithm substitution attack ASA = (ASA.Gen, ASA.Enc, ASA.Ext), and encryption scheme SES = (SES.Gen, SES.Enc, SES.Dec)
Algorithm 2: ASA-distinguishing (detection) experiment with security parameter κ.
An algorithm substitution attack ASA is called indistinguishable from the symmetric encryption scheme SES, if for every watchdog Watch, there is a negligible function negl such that
The maximal advantage of any watchdog distinguishing ASA from SES is called the indistinguishability or insecurity of ASA and is defined as
In [7] , Bellare et al. proposed a (stateless) construction ASA against all symmetric encryption schemes SES. They prove in Theorem 3 that if SES is a randomized, stateless, coin-injective symmetric encryption scheme with randomness-length r and if the ASA uses a PRF F then for a watchdog Watch that makesueries to its CH oracle we can construct an adversary A such that Adv enc-watch Watch,ASA,SES (κ) ≤ q/2 2 r + Adv prf A,F (κ), where A makes q oracle queries and its running time is that of Watch.
Bellare et al. conclude that as long as their scheme uses a nontrivial amount of randomness, for example r ≥ 7 bits resulting 2 r ≥ 128, Theorem 3 implies that the subversion is undetectable.
BACKGROUNDS OF STEGANOGRAPHY
The definitions of the basic steganography concepts presented in this section are essentially those of [16] and [12] .
In order to define undetectable hidden communication, we need to introduce a notion of unsuspicious communication. We do this via the notion of a channel C. A channel C on the alphabet Σ with maximal document length C.n is a function that maps a string of previously send elements h ∈ (Σ ≤ C.n ) * -the history -to a probability distribution upon Σ ≤ C.n . We denote this probability distribution by C h . The elements of Σ ≤ C.n are called documents. As usually, we will assume that the sequences of documents are efficiently prefix-free recognizable.
A stegosystem S on a family of channels C = {C κ } κ ∈N is a triple of probabilistic polynomial-time (according to the security parameter κ) algorithms: S = (S.Gen, S.Enc, S.Dec) with parameters S.ml(κ) describing the message length of the subliminal (hidden, or attacker) message and S.ol(κ) describing the length of a generated sequence of stego documents to embed the whole hidden message. The algorithms have the following functionality:
• The key generator S.Gen takes the unary presentation of an integer κ -the security parameter -and outputs a key (we will call it an attacker key) ak ∈ {0, 1} κ of length κ. To improve readability, if the stegosystem is clear from the context, we will omit the prefix S.
In order to be useful, the stegodecoder should reliably decode the embedded message from the sequence of documents. As in the setting of algorithm substitution attack, the complete output of ℓ documents of the stegosystem for the history h on the subliminal message am of length S.ml(κ) is denoted as S.Enc ℓ, C (ak, am, h) and is defined as follows.
The unreliability UnRel S, C (κ) of the stegosystem S on the channel family {C κ } κ ∈N with security parameter κ is defined as
where the maximum is taken over all ak ∈ supp(S.Gen(1 κ )), am ∈ {0, 1} S.ml(κ) , and h ∈ (Σ n(κ) ) * . If there is a negligible function negl such that UnRel S, C (κ) ≤ negl(κ), we say that S is reliable on C. Furthermore, the reboot-reliability of the stegosystem S is defined as
where the maxima are taken over all ak ∈ supp(S.Gen(1 κ )), am ∈ {0, 1} S.ml(κ) , all positive integers τ ≤ ℓ, all histories h 1 , . . . , h τ , and all positive integers ℓ 1 , . . . , ℓ τ such that ℓ 1 + . . . + ℓ τ = ℓ. The documents d 1 , . . . , d ℓ are the concatenated output of the runs
We say that the stegosystem S is reboot-reliable if UnRel ⋆ S, C (κ) is bounded from above by a negligible function. This corresponds to a situation where the stegoencoder is restarted τ times, each time with the history h i , and is allowed to generate ℓ i documents. Note that reboot-reliability is a strictly stronger requirement than reliability and we can thus conclude
To define the security of a stegosystem, we first specify the abilities of an attacker: A warden Ward is a probabilistic polynomialtime algorithm that will have access to a challenge oracle CH. This challenge oracle can be called with a message am and a history h and is either equal to S.Enc C (ak, am, h, σ ) for a key ak ← S.Gen(1 κ ) or equal to random documents of the channel.
The goal of the warden is to distinguish between those oracles. It also has access to samples of the channel C κ h for a freely chosen history h. Formally, the chosen-hiddentext-attack-advantage is defined via the following game SS-CHA-Dist: The maximal advantage of any warden against S is the insecurity InSec cha S, C (κ) and defined as max Ward {Adv cha Ward,S, C (κ)}. A very common technique in the design of secure stegosystems called rejection sampling goes back to an idea of Anderson, presented in [1] . The basic concept is that the stegoencoder samples from the channel until he finds a document that already encodes the hiddentext. This was first used by Cachin in [10] to construct a secure stegosystem in the information-theoretic sense.
In the following, let F be pseudorandom function that maps input strings of length F.in(κ) (documents) to strings of length F.out(κ) = log(ml(κ)) + 1 (message parts). To simplify notation, we treat the output of F.Eval k as a pair (b, j) with |b | = 1 and |j | = log(ml(κ)). The encoder of the rejection sampling stegosystem, which we denote as RejSam F , is defined as follows: The key generator RejSam F .Gen is equal to F.Gen and the decoder derives am, as long as its input documents contain every bit am[j], by applying F.Eval ak to these documents. Below we present the description of the decoder. Note that the stegosystem is stateless. In [16] , Hopper et al. were the first to prove the security of this stegosystem in the complexity-theoretic model. Their argument was simplified by Dedić et al. in [12] and by Backes and Cachin in [3] . The version given here is based upon the stateless construction of Dedić et al. and also uses the idea of Bellare et al. in [6] to apply the coupon collector's problem to completely get rid of the state by randomly choosing an index to embed.
The analysis of the coupon collector's problem shows that by sending ml(κ) · (ln ml(κ) + β) documents -for an appropriate value β -one only introduces a term exp(−β) into the unreliability (see e. g. [19] for a proof of this fact), which can be made negligible by setting β ≥ ml(κ) − ln(ml(κ)). The output length on messages of length ml(κ) will thus be bounded by ml(κ) 2 .
The security of this system directly follows from the analysis of Dedić et al. in [12] : Theorem 4.1 ([12, Theorems 4 and 5]). For every polynomial ml(κ), there exists a universal history-ignorant stegosystem S = RejSam F with security parameter κ and s ≥ 1 such that for every channel C κ we have
The notation InSec prf F, C (κ) indicates the insecurity of the pseudorandom function F relative to the channel C. Informally, this means that the attacker against F also has sampling access to C (for a formal definition, see [12] ). For an efficiently sampleable channel C (i. e. one that can be simulated by a PPTM), it clearly holds that
. All channels used in this work are efficiently sampleable and we will thus omit the index C from the term InSec.
ENCRYPTION SCHEMES AS STEGANOGRAPHIC CHANNELS
Let SES = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a symmetric encryption scheme that encodes messages of length ml(κ) into ciphertexts of length cl(κ) ≥ ml(κ) and let ℓ be a polynomial of κ. For SES we define a channel family, named C κ SES (ℓ), indexed with parameter κ ∈ N, where the documents will correspond to the input of generalized algorithm substitution attack against encryption schemes. The essential idea behind the definition of the channel C κ SES (ℓ) is that for all k ∈ supp(Gen(1 κ )) and every sequence of messages m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m ℓ(κ) , with m i ∈ {0, 1} ml(κ) , for the history
the distribution of the sequences of documents
generated by the channel is exactly the same as the distribution for Enc(k, m 1 ) || Enc(k, m 2 ) || . . . || Enc(k, m ℓ(κ) ).
To give a formal definition of {C κ SES (ℓ)} κ ∈N we need to specify the probability distributions for any history h. Thus, we define the family, on the alphabet {0, 1}, as follows.
For the empty history h = ∅, define C κ SES (ℓ) ∅ as the distribution of all keys generated by Gen(1 κ ). For a key k ∈ supp(Gen(1 κ )) and a (possibly empty) sequence of messages m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m r , with m i ∈ {0, 1} ml(κ) and 0 ≤ r ≤ ℓ(κ) − 1, the distribution
is the uniform distribution on all messages m r +1 ∈ {0, 1} ml(κ) . For k ∈ supp(Gen(1 κ )), a sequence of messages m 1 , m 2 , . . . , m ℓ(κ) with m i ∈ {0, 1} ml(κ) , and a (possibly empty) sequence of ciphertexts c 1 , . . . , c r , with c i ∈ supp(Enc(k, m ((i−1) mod ℓ(κ))+1 )), the distribution C κ SES (ℓ) k | |m 1 | |m 2 | |... | |m ℓ(κ ) | |c 1 | |c 2 | |... | |... | |c r is the distribution of Enc(k, m (r mod ℓ(κ))+1 ).
ASAS AGAINST ENCRYPTION IN THE STEGANOGRAPHIC MODEL
The main message of our paper is that algorithm substitution attacks against a primitive Π are equivalent to the use of steganography on a corresponding channel C Π determined by the protocol Π. Focusing on symmetric encryption schemes as a common cryptographic primitive, we will show in this section exemplary proofs for the general relations between ASAs and steganography.
In the previous section we showed a formal specification of the family of communication channels C κ SES (ℓ) determined by a symmetric encryption scheme SES. We will now prove that a secure and reliable stegosystem on C κ SES (ℓ) implies the existence of an indistinguishable and successful algorithm substitution attack on SES. On the other hand, we will also show that the existence of an indistinguishable and successful algorithm substitution attack on SES implies a secure and reliable stegosystem on C κ SES (ℓ). As a consequence we get a construction of an ASA against any encryption scheme using a generic stegosystem like e. g. this proposed by Dedić et al. [12] . Thus, we can conclude Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 proposed by Bellare et al. in [7] that there exist indistinguishable and successful ASAs against encryption schemes. Moreover we obtain Theorem 4 in [7] which says that an ASA is impossible for unique ciphertext symmetric encryption schemes.
Steganography implies ASAs
Theorem 6.1. Assume SES is a symmetric encryption scheme and let S be a stegosystem on the channel C := C κ SES (S.ol(κ)) determined by SES. Then there exists an algorithm substitution attack ASA against SES of indistinguishability, resp. reliability such that:
InSec enc-watch ASA,SES (κ) ≤ InSec cha S, C (κ) and UnRel ASA,SES (κ) = UnRel ⋆ S, C (κ).
Proof. Let SES = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a symmetric encryption scheme and S = (SGen, SEnc, SDec) be a stegosystem on the channel C. To simplify notation, let ℓ = ℓ(κ) := S.ol(κ). We will construct the algorithm substitution attack ASA = (AGen, AEnc, AExt) on SES from the stegosystem S and show the indistinguishability and success of ASA depending on security and reliability of S. The components of the ASA are defined as follows.
The key generator AGen just simulates SGen -the key generator of the stegosystem. It will output the attack key ak. The encoding algorithm AEnc on input ak ∈ supp(AGen(1 κ )), am ∈ {0, 1} S.ml(κ) , k ∈ supp(Gen(1 κ )), and m ∈ {0, 1} SES.ml(κ) simulates SEnc on channel C with input key ak, the message am and the history h = k || m ℓ , where m ℓ is the string of length ℓ · |m| containing ℓ copies of m. Whenever SEnc makes a query to its channel oracle, algorithm AEnc uses Enc on input k and m to produce a corresponding ciphertext and sends it to SEnc. The encoder AEnc then outputs the document d generated by SEnc. Finally, the extraction algorithm AExt on input ak ∈ supp(AGen(1 κ )) and documents d 1 , . . . , d ℓ just simulates SDec on the same inputs.
As one can see from the definitions, ASA is a generalized algorithm substitution attack against SES. We will now prove that it is indistinguishable from SES and that it is successful.
We prove first indistinguishability of the system. Let Watch be a watchdog against the above ASA with maximal advantage, i. e.
Adv enc-watch
Watch,ASA,SES (κ) = InSec enc-watch ASA,SES (κ),
where Adv enc-watch Watch,ASA,SES (κ) is equal to the success probability that ASA-Dist Watch,ASA,SES (κ) = true. We will now construct a warden Ward from Watch such that
Adv cha
Ward,S, C (κ) = Adv enc-watch Watch,ASA,SES (κ).
Thus, we will get that
The warden Ward on input 1 κ just simulates the watchdog Watch and gives the same output as Watch at the end of the simulation. Whenever the watchdog makes a query on input am, k, and m to its challenging oracle (that is either equal to SES's encryption algorithm Enc(k, m) or to ASA's encryption AEnc(ak, am, k, m, σ ) for ak ← AGen(1 κ )), the warden Ward queries its own challenging oracle with message am, state σ and history h = k || m ℓ . Note that the challenging oracle of Ward is either equal to the channel C or to SEnc(ak, am, h, σ ) for ak ← SGen(1 κ ). which completes the proof of (1). We still need to prove that AExt is reliably able to extract the attacker message am from the ciphertext. But, as AExt = SDec, the reboot-reliability of SDec directly implies that AExt is successful with probability of 1 − negl(κ). □ By combining Theorem 6.1 and Theorem 4.1, we can conclude the following corollary. Corollary 6.2. For every symmetric encryption scheme SES, there exists an algorithm subsection attack ASA with message length ml(κ) and parameter s ≥ 1 such that
SES (S.ol(κ)) One can compare this corollary to the construction used in the proof of Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 in [6] . We can see that our generic algorithm substitution attack gets almost the same bounds for insecurity and for unreliability.
Note that the protocols in [2, 6] and our generic protocol of Corollary 6.2 have a very bad rate: ml ml ·(ln ml +β ) = 1/(ln ml +β) for an appropriate value β. One can easily modify the above constructions such that instead of one bit b of a message am we embed a block of log(ml) bits per ciphertext. This improves the rate to log ml ln(ml)−ln log(ml)+β = Θ(1).
ASAs imply Steganography
Theorem 6.3. Assume SES is a symmetric encryption scheme and let ASA be an algorithm substitution attack against SES of output length ASA.ol(κ). Then there exists a stegosystem S with the output length S.ol(κ) = 2 · ASA.ol(κ) + 1 on the channel C := C κ SES (S.ol(κ)) determined by SES such that S's insecurity, resp. its reliability satisfy InSec cha S, C (κ) ≤ InSec enc-watch ASA,SES (κ) and UnRel S, C (κ) = UnRel ASA,SES (κ).
Proof. Let SES = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a symmetric encryption scheme and ASA = (AGen, AEnc, AExt) be an algorithm substitution attack against SES. To simplify notation, let ℓ = ASA.ol(κ). We construct the stegosystem S = (SGen, SEnc, SDec) on C out of the ASA.
The key generation algorithm SGen simply simulates AGen. It will output the key ak. To encode a message am using the key ak, the stegoencoding algorithm SEnc generates for any history h a sequence of S.ol(κ) = 2ℓ + 1 documents such that the last ℓ documents embed the message am. To describe the algorithm we need to distinguish between different given histories h. h = ∅: In this case, SEnc chooses a random key k ← SES.Gen(1 κ ) using the generation algorithm of SES and outputs k. h = k || m 1 || m 2 || . . . || m r for 0 ≤ r ≤ ℓ − 1: Encoder SEnc samples a random message m r +1 and outputs it. h = k || m 1 || m 2 || . . . || m ℓ || c 1 || . . . || c r with r ≥ 0: The stegoencoder SEnc simulates AEnc(ak, am, k, m (r +1) mod ℓ+1 ) and outputs the generated ciphertext. Note that by construction, in any case the last ℓ documents generated by SEnc 2ℓ+1 embed the message am in the same way as done by ASA ℓ .
If the decoder SDec is given documents d 1 , . . . , d 2ℓ+1 , we output AExt(ak, d ℓ+2 , . . . , d 2ℓ+1 ).
As one can see from the definitions, the decoding algorithm of S is history-ignorant. We will prove that on the channel C = C κ SES (2ℓ+1) the security and reliability of the stegosystem S satisfy the stated conditions. We first analyze the security of the system. Let Ward be a warden against S on C with maximal advantage, i. e.
Adv cha
Ward,S, C (κ) = InSec cha S, C (κ),
where Adv cha Ward,S, C (κ) = Pr[SS-CHA-Dist Ward,S, C (κ) = true]. We will construct a watchdog Watch against the algorithm substitution attack ASA with the same advantage as Ward:
Adv enc-watch Watch,ASA,SES (κ) = Adv cha Ward,S, C (κ). This will prove that
The watchdog Watch on input 1 κ simply simulates the warden Ward. Whenever the warden Ward makes a query to its channel oracle C with a history h, the watchdog Watch simulates the oracle response as follows:
• If h = ∅, the watchdog uses Gen(1 κ ) to construct a key k and returns k to the warden. • If h = k || m 1 || . . . || m r with r < ℓ, the watchdog uniformly chooses a message m r +1 from {0, 1} SES.ml(κ) and outputs m r +1 .
) and outputs c r +1 . Clearly, this simulates the channel distribution C perfectly. If the warden queries its challenge oracle Ward.CH with chosen message am, state σ , and history h (that is either equivalent to sampling from C h or to calling SEnc(ak, am, h, σ )), the watchdog simulates the response of the oracle Ward.CH as follows:
• If h = ∅ then Watch chooses a random key k ← Gen(1 κ ) and outputs it. The reliability of S is the same as the success probability of ASA since SDec simply simulates AExt. □ By using the fact that channels with min-entropy 0 can not be used for steganography (see e. g. Theorem 6 in [16] ) and observing that channels corresponding to deterministic encryption schemes have min-entropy 0, we can conclude the following corollary: Corollary 6.4. For all deterministic encryption schemes SES and all algorithm substitution attacks ASA against SES:
We thus have
InSec enc-watch ASA,SES (κ) ≥ 1.
Note that this exactly Theorem 4 in [7] .
GENERAL RESULTS
Let R be a polynomial-time randomized algorithm with hardwired secret s which takes inputs x and generates outputs y. The general task of an algorithm substitution attack against R is to construct a subverted algorithm AR ak which using a hidden hardwired random key ak outputs on the secret s in the sequence of calls AR ak (s, x 1 ), AR ak (s, x 2 ), . . . a sequence such that (1) the output AR ak (s, x 1 ), AR ak (s, x 2 ), . . . is indistinguishable from R(s, x 1 ), R(s, x 2 ), . . . and (2) AR ak (s, x 1 ), AR ak (s, x 2 ), . . . embeds the secret s.
In our setting we model the attack on R as a stegosystem on a channel determined by R and define such a channel.
ASA against a Randomized Algorithm
In this section we give formal definitions for algorithm substitution attack AR, its advantage Adv Watch,AR,R , etc. Formally, an algorithm substitution attack against R is a triple of efficient algorithms ASA = (Gen, AR, Ext), where Gen generates the key ak, the algorithm AR takes the key ak, a secret s and all inputs x 1 , x 2 , . . . to R and the extractor Ext tries to extract s from the outputs of AR with the help of ak (but without knowing x 1 , x 2 , . . .). Similarly to the setting for encryption schemes, ASA is called indistinguishable, if every PPTM Watch -the watchdog -is not able to distinguish between AR ak (s, x 1 ), AR ak (s, x 2 ), . . . and R(x 1 ), R(x 2 ), . . . even if he is allowed to choose s and all x i . This is defined via the game RASA-Dist Watch,ASA,R defined analogously to ASA-Dist. The maximal advantage of any watchdog distinguishing ASA from R is called the insecurity or indistinguishability of ASA and is formally defined as The unreliability of ASA is also defined like before: 
Channel determined by a Randomized Algorithm
Let R be a polynomial-time randomized algorithm with parameter κ.
We assume that the secret s is generated by Gen and the inputs x to R are generated by the randomized polynomial-time algorithm GenInput, associated with R (which may be chosen adversarially as shown in the definition above). Let ℓ be a polynomial of κ. For R we define a channel family, named C κ R (ℓ), indexed with parameter κ ∈ N, with documents which correspond to the input of AR. The essential idea behind the definition of the channel C κ R (ℓ) is that for all s ∈ supp(Gen(1 κ )) and every sequence of inputs x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x ℓ(κ) , with x i ∈ supp(GenInput(1 κ )), for the history
generated by the channel is exactly the same as the distribution for
To give a formal definition of {C κ R (ℓ)} κ ∈N we need to specify the probability distributions for any history h. Thus, we define the family, on the alphabet {0, 1}, as follows: For empty history h = ∅, we define C κ R (ℓ) ∅ as the distribution on all possible keys generated by Gen(1 κ ). For s ∈ supp(Gen(1 κ )) and a (possibly empty) sequence inputs
, and a (possibly empty) sequence of R's outputs y 1 , . . . , y r with y i ∈ supp(R(s, x ((i−1) mod ℓ(κ))+1 )), the probability distribution of C κ R (ℓ) s | |x 1 | |x 2 | |... | |x ℓ(κ ) | |y 1 | |y 2 | |... | |... | |y r is the probability distribution of R(s, x (r mod ℓ(κ))+1 ).
Results
The theorems proved in the previous section can simply be generalized by using our general construction of the channel C k R (ℓ) for the randomized algorithm R and the generic stegosystem RejSam F provided by Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 7.1. For every randomized algorithm R, there exists a generic algorithm substitution attack ASA against R such that These general results also imply several other results from the literature, for example on signature schemes. Ateniese et al. [2] study algorithm substitution attacks 3 on signature schemes SIG = (Gen, Sign, Vrfy), where
• The key generator SIG.Gen produces upon input 1 κ a pair (pk, sk) of keys with |pk| = |sk| = κ. We call pk the public key and sk the secret key. On the negative side (from the view of an algorithm substitution attack), they show that unique signature schemes are resistant to ASAs fulfilling the verifiability condition. Informally this means that (a) each message has exactly on signature (for a fixed key-pair) and (b) each signature produced by the ASA must be valid. Theorem 7.5 (Theorem 3 in [2] ). For all unique signature schemes SIG and all algorithm substitution attacks ASA against them that fulfill the verifiability condition, there is a negligible function negl such that InSec asa ASA,SIG (κ) ≥ 1 − negl(κ). As unique signature schemes do not provide enough min-entropy for a stegosystem, this results follows from Theorem 1.3.
A LOWER BOUND FOR UNIVERSAL ASA
A setting similar to steganography, where universal stegosystems exist, that can be used for any channel of sufficiently large minentropy, would be quite useful for attackers that plan to launch algorithm substitution attacks. Such a system would allow them to attack any SES without knowing the internal specification of the encryption algorithm. A closer look at the results in [2, 6, 7] reveals that their attacks do indeed go without internal knowledge of the used encryption algorithm. They only manipulate the random coins used in the encryption process. Note that SES.Enc(k, m; ρ) -where 3 To be more precise, their attacks only replace the signing algorithm Sign. ρ denotes the random coins used by SES.Enc -is a deterministic function, as SES.Enc is a PPTM.
We thus define a universal ASA as a triple of PPTMs such that for every symmetric encryption scheme SES, the triple ASA SES = (ASA.Gen, ASA.Enc SES.Enc(·, ·;·) , ASA.Ext)
is an ASA against SES. The encoder ASA.Enc has only oracle access to the encryption algorithm SES.Enc of the SES: It may thus choose arbitrary values k, m, and ρ and receives a ciphertext c ← SES.Enc(k, m; ρ) without having a complete description of the encryption schemes.
Let Q be set of ciphertexts that ASA.Enc receives upon its queries. It might be possible for the encoding algorithm ASA.Enc to construct a new ciphertext c Q from the elements of Q, but such a construction must be highly specific to a single SES and thus nonuniversal. We thus say that ASA is consistent, if ASA.Enc SES.Enc(·, ·;·) only outputs ciphertexts in Q for all encryption schemes SES. Note that the encoding Enc SES.Enc(·, ·;·) of a consistent ASA with parameters (ak, am, k, m, σ ) may output a ciphertext c with m SES.Dec(k, c) if c was provided by the encryption oracle. But generating a c with m = SES.Dec(k, c) is only allowed if c was given by the oracle.
As noted above, all attacks in [2, 6, 7] are consistent and universal and Bellare, Jaeger, Kane explicitly state in their work [6] that their ASA works against any encryption scheme of sufficiently large minentropy. We also remark that the rejection sampling ASA presented earlier is universal and consistent.
For such a universal and consistent attack ASA and an encryption scheme SES, denote by ASA.query(SES, κ) the expected number of oracle calls that ASA.Enc SES.Enc(·, ·;·) makes to the encryption algorithm SES.Enc, i. e. the expected size of Q.
In the steganographic setting, Dedić et al. showed in [12] that (under the cryptographic assumption that one-way functions exist) no universal stegosystem can embed more than O(1) · log(κ) bits per document and thus proved that the rejection sampling based systems have optimal rate.
The critical observation is that a universal stegosystem can only work upon the documents sampled from the channel, as most channel distributions are not learnable due to information-theoretic reasons. The stegosystem is thus not able to generate valid documents by itself. Their proof crucially depends on the fact that the stegosystem can not deduce anything about the distribution of unseen documents from the given documents. This is summarized by two key properties. The first one (Lemma 2 in [12] ) says that secure stegosystems almost always output query answers which belong to the channel's support. This can be adapted to universal ASAs (in a weaker form) as follows: Proof. Since the watchdog knows k and m, it can verify if SES.Dec(k, c) = m and thus detect whenever the universal ASA outputs a non-ciphertext. □
The second key property (stated as Lemma 1 in [12] ) informally says that a reliable universal stegosystem that samples at most n documents can only embed log(n) bits per document. This is due to the fact that the embedding must be injective with regard to the attacker message am and that the sampling of the documents is independent. Note that the independence of the documents described above for the steganographic setting is not true for ASAs: As the ciphertexts are constructed by the same PPTM SES.Enc (on the same key k and the same message m), there is a clear dependency between the ciphertexts usable by the ASA. One can thus not simply translate the second property into the ASA setting.
In the following, we will taker a closer look at an example that clearly shows the dependency between the ciphertexts and how an ASA can make use of this fact. We will then modify this example and prove that this dependency can be eliminated in the random oracle model. The full version of this work also shows how one can get rid of the dependence on the random oracle model and the requirement of consistency by using signature schemes similar to the approach used by the authors in [9] . A minor modification of this example allows us to also state the second key property in the setting of ASAs in the random oracle model.
Consider an example presented by Bellare et al. in [7] , where they presented an attack against symmetric encryption schemes that surface their initialization vector (IV). One such example is the random counter mode CTR$ F of [5] making use of the PRF F. For the sake of completeness, the encoder CTR$ F .Enc of the random counter mode is defined below, where m is a message of length ℓ · F.out(κ). In a universal and consistent ASA, the encoder ASA.Enc can observe that the first part c 0 of the produced ciphertexts equals the random coins ρ it gave to its encryption oracle. It may thus compute a certain ρ * = SES.Enc(ak, am) (which is indistinguishable from a random string) and the resulting ciphertext c * = SES.Enc(k, m; ρ * ) would thus embed the attacker message. In contrast to the steganographic setting, where the stegoencoder can simply query its oracle for channel documents, a universal and consistent ASA can choose the random coins and make use of the dependencies between those coins and the generated ciphertext.
In the following, we will thus work in the random oracle model introduced by Bellare and Rogaway [8] to modify the random counter mode CTR$ F of [5] such that no ASA can embed more than O(1) · log(κ) bits per ciphertext by getting rid of these dependencies. If H : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} F.in(κ) is a random oracle (see e. g. [17] for a detailed treatment of this topic), we modify the algorithm above by setting c 0 := H(r ) and choosing r of length n such that | H(r )| = F.in(κ). Denote this modified version by CTR$ F,H . Due to the definition of the random oracle, until H(r ) is computed, Pr[H(r ) = x] = 2 − F.in(κ) for all x, i. e. no one can predict the output of the random oracle. Clearly, if one replaces the PRF F by a completely random function f , the output of CTR$ f ,H .Enc(k, m; r ) is independent of k, m and r . This implies that the set of sampled ciphertexts C is a completely random subset of supp(CTR$ f ,H .Enc(k, m)). We can thus state the following. This allows us to conclude the following corollary bounding the number of bits embeddable into a single ciphertext by a universal algorithm substitution attack. Corollary 8.3. In the random oracle model, there is no universal and consistent ASA that embeds more than O(1) · log(κ) bits per ciphertext.
CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we proved that ASAs in the strong undetectability model of Bellare, Jaeger and Kane [6] are a special case of stegosystems on a certain kind of channels described by symmetric encryption schemes. This gives a rigorous proof of the well-known connection between steganography and algorithm substitution attacks. We make use of this relationship to show that a wide range of results on ASAs are already present in the steganographic literature. Inspired by this connection, we define universal ASAs that work with no knowledge on the internal implementation of the symmetric encryption schemes and thus work for all such encryption schemes with sufficiently large min-entropy. As almost all known ASAs are universal, we investigate their rate -the number of embedded bits per ciphertext -and prove a logarithmic upper bound of this rate.
